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The philosophy and execution of change at DE provide lessons in mutual IT-business learning and relationship-building for businesses in transition to greater dependency on strategically important IT.
Direct Energy: Creating a Business from Scratch
In 2000, top management of Centrica, a diversified utility in the United Kingdom, sent Deryk King to North America to start a new business. With capital from the parent and a relatively unrestricted mandate to "see what you can do…," King built an energy-based business by acquisitions in Canada and the United States. Initially focusing on acquisitions, DE found businesses of interest in the energy industry were changing dramatically as a result of deregulation, the Enron scandal, and extreme fluctuations in gas and electric prices. King and his team evolved a strategy based on being a vertically integrated producer, trader and reseller, and distributor of energy, as well as a provider of related services to consumers. Its particular energy business model, not unique in the industry but central and early in its competitive environment, was owning or contracting with supply resources of energy and offering customers fixed monthly charges rather than energy price dependent charges. As one executive put it, "We sell peace of mind, both to distributors and consumers. We say to them, 'Were going to fix your monthly energy rate, like a known mortgage rate.'" Over six years more than 20 acquisitions and a few sales of businesses were made, with a net investment totaling some $2 billion. In 2007 DE operated in 18 states and provinces and over 30 discrete regulatory jurisdictions. Turnover in 2006 came in at $7.6 billion, and EBIT around $415 million.
1 (Exhibit 1 shows selected financial and operational trends over the life of DE.) 1 Total North America markets for the businesses DE was in were $370 billion for energy (gas and electricity) and $140 billion for related services.
DE consisted of four basic businesses:
1. Upstream gas drilling and power plants, where energy was produced: gas fields in Alberta, and three electric power plants and four wind generation units in Texas.
2. The Energy Management Group (EMG) managed the buying and selling of energy futures to supply DE's own customers and to trade in the respective commodity futures markets. Originally only a procurement business, EMG at DE evolved to also be a profit-centered trading business. Improvement in EMG's forecasting of energy supply and demand would have great impact on DE's profitability. The industry standard for forecasting was to come within two to three percent of demand. An improvement to one percent for DE would represent an increase in EBIT of some 10%. In 2006, approximately 12% of DE's operating profits came from EMG. Trading desks were run 24x7 in Calgary and Houston for gas and electricity.
Critical was getting forecasts of demand right and "risk management" decisions on buying and selling of future contracts for energy delivery.
3. The downstream business was selling gas and electricity to households and businesses. Here, knowing the regulatory situation and adapting to it were key to business success. The apparent uniformity of operations of different energy distributors in North America was complicated by wide differences in the regulatory environments at the level of provinces, states and municipalities-differences that affected billing, customer information, and accounting. There were also differences in the relationships with suppliers and the consumer. Thus the DE "brand" might appear at the head of a consumer or business customer bill, or it might be a line item on the bill of a retailing utility who served as a channel for DE.
4. The services business was for installation and maintenance of gas and electricity consuming equipment such as furnaces and air conditioning for residential and commercial construction, and subsequent warranty servicing. The work of these committees was essentially to manage demand so that IT resources could be applied to the highest business priorities. This required carefully developed business cases for projects-aligned to declared corporate strategy, and to conduct priority setting for all business initiatives that were IT-enabled. Historically, businesses made investment decisions within their silo without prioritization or alignment, in effect by "wish list." Enterprise-wide decisions had been limited to core infrastructure. Under the new methods, investments were to be leveraged by being enterprise level wherever possible. Investments within a business silo were to be validated only if they enabled the highest value initiatives.
Categories for projects were made explicit based on historical categories for capital expenditure decisions. These were: 1) projects necessary to keep the business going (like infrastructure maintenance), 2) mandatory projects (such as health and safety, regulatory, legal), 3) projects with a cost return within two years, and 4) "discretionary" projects, those with a cost return beyond two years. The ICC at the corporate level consisted of the CFO, Kalia (Chair, as CIO) and the head of Strategy. Like the BACs in the business units, the ICC role was not only to review and decide on key projects of a certain scope (crossdivisional, in particular) but also of a certain size. Whether or not the funding for project came from a business budget, if it met either of those criteria it had to be reviewed by the ICC. Their role also included review of project progress, with a view to understanding what value had been created. In looking across the enterprise, the committee used a portfolio approach of four IT asset categories: infrastructure, transactional, informational, and strategic. As of early 2007 these categories were used to track investment decisions rather than to influence them. 2 Kalia expected that keeping a balanced portfolio overall, the goal of this mechanism, would be introduced as a criterion for investment decisions by the ICC beginning in 2007.
By 2007 all twelve business units involved in DE's four business areas adhered to the governance process of listing their projects in priority order, a change not only for IT but other capital investment requests. Three business units, the most profitable ones, had adopted the governance to the point that it was integral to their management. In two cases, heads of business units were saying and giving presentations that their BACs were changing the way they did their business thinking. Reflecting on these committees, Kalia recalled: In building his relationships with the executive team, Kalia himself faced a steep learning curve in understanding the energy businesses. His credibility was helped by experience in financial trading, as his peers recognized the value of IT to the EMG business and the parallels with the financial world. As often as not in discussions with the business, Kalia found himself making the case not for new IT systems, but for a factbased understanding of the problem and the intention of what the business had in mind. This approach, manifested in business cases and their discussion, was seen by executives as a new kind of dialogue. It put the IS staff necessarily in a position of equality with business managers rather than being traditional "order takers. After six months on the job, Kalia suggested to Deryk King that King and the CFO, David Clarke, attend a two-day executive program on IT for business executives. "I knew I was taking a risk recommending this," Kalia said. "But I knew the terminology and approaches in the course, such as governance and investment portfolios, fit in with what I was pushing for." King reflected back on the experience as quite positive and worth his time.
Governance also applied to project management and the relationship of IT developers to their business counterparts. Kalia introduced several elements of "agile programming" to IT at DE. As a result, all projects were put on 90-day cycles with ten-or 15-day milestone checks, called "iterations" or "sprints." Business users were increasingly responsible for delivery along with IT, and business people remained in regular contact. Most projects had meetings of business and IT people every morning for 15 minutes, known as "scrum meetings."
The IT Estate
The organization chart for IS is shown in Exhibit 5. Kalia had seven direct reports, two of whom he had hired since taking his job. The team, including him, was noted for its diversity of professional education and experience. They held eleven degrees among them, including a PhD and three MBAs, one Chartered Accountant, two Chartered Engineers, and two former registered securities traders. Most had worked in at least two countries, and in sum they spoke more than eight languages. Experience included 22 years overall in energy industries. Heads of IT in each business had a solid line to Kalia, and a dotted line to their division presidents. Total employment in IS was 370, including contractors, and the IS budget was $140 million, or 1.6% of DE's revenue and 12.7% of operating expenses. DE used operating expense as a percent of gross margin as an indicator. Trends in the IS budget and employment and business ratios are shown in Exhibit 6, along with conclusions reached by IS in presentations to senior managers throughout Direct Energy.
Virtually all annual IT expenditure, particularly for established operations and projects requested by the businesses, was dealt with through the governance process. At the same time an important funding source was "self generated" funds, made available by IS from its own savings efforts. In 2006 this source amounted to approximately $2.25 million. These funds made possible the creation of positions for new competences, such as process engineering and enterprise architecture, as well as strategic investments such as a graduate recruitment program. It was hoped that creation of these competences and programs would yield further benefits and savings, thereby creating a virtuous circle.
Reporting to Kalia as CTO, head of Operations, Shared Systems and Architecture was Bernie Gillies. Gillies, as CIO, had been responsible for all of DE's systems since the early days. A benchmark evaluation by an outside entity in late 2006 gave DE high marks for its established IT operations and infrastructure. It reported that DE's costs of IT Operations were 24% below those of top-performing companies, and accomplished with 19% fewer staff, while service quality was comparable. At the same time the study identified potential annual cost savings of some $2 million which could be achieved without additional outsourcing, and more which could be achieved if DE chose to do offshoring, which it had not done to date. Kalia and King pointed to this assessment as very positive, but noted that it applied only to the ongoing operational services, not to new initiatives and the more difficult to benchmark changes in governance, project delivery, and business process changes for which IS was now responsible. As King put it, "We've benchmarked half of what IS does, now we need to benchmark the other half…"
In conjunction with the establishment of governance committees and other mechanisms for IT investment, aimed at involving enterprise-level executives as well as business managers within the businesses, Kalia looked for opportunities for enterprise-wide development projects. Shortly after his arrival he was asked to make a judgment on the installation of an ERP across several businesses, a solution underway in Centrica at the time. After brief review and familiarization with the business, Kalia recommended strongly against the ERP approach. He made the case that not only would it be a large investment, but that the problem with integration across DE's businesses, even those with identical business models and products, was not immediately one of automation by systems. Rather, business processes and data would need to be changed for integration to succeed and benefits of it to be achieved.
An opportunity for a company-wide systemsdriven project arose in 2006 with the web portal project. Driven by a need to exploit the web as a low cost channel for sales and post-sale services, multiple business units signed on to this initiative. Getting agreement on the priorities and making staff available was non-trivial: "We put 35 people in a room for two days, and they came out with agreements on the priorities and nature of the project," Kalia recalled. Just as important, a multi-business unit "Executive Steering Committee" was created to oversee the progress of the project, to remove obstacles, and support risky decisions such as going live on beta software.
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In short order, DE had repatriated a UK-hosted website to North America (important for search engine rankings), replaced the content management system, rebranded the website with a new corporate look and feel, and added entirely new functionality, such as the ability of customers to view and pay bills online.
Reflecting on the experience, Kalia considered the project a good initiation of front-end "hothouse" practices, a demonstration of the power of agile methods, and a validation of robust governance for execution with the Executive Steering Committee. Kalia and his senior colleagues agreed that business managers and the culture, heavily inclined toward near-term and quick action decision making, would not welcome a topdown corporate imposition of new systems or process change, nor even spending a lot of time investigating operational issues and problems. The approach taken was first to offer expertise to the businesses for teams to work with their operations managers on specific improvement projects within their areas. No intention of cross-business synergies or process or data uniformity was included. These projects were spearheaded by Sanjay Acharya, head of Process Engineering and a direct report to Kalia. Acharya was a Chartered Accountant and an MBA graduate of the MIT Sloan School of Management. His position was based within IS, but operated exclusively outside IS. Archarya described his approach and one successful project as follows: By mid-2006 the guerilla, middle-up approach had enough success to justify the executive endorsement for doing it. For 2007 a major initiative was announced, one among ten written into performance contracts of divisional heads and their organizations, to collaborate across divisions in a Lead to Cash (L2C) study. An extension of the separate projects that had been done previously would be the next step in continuing local optimization and building the basis for common data definitions. While full integration of any particular process such as sales or billing, a logical outcome of the L2C initiative, was still at least a year away, Kalia saw the opportunity as a significant step in how change was being managed: External recognition of the effort and progress in changing the role of IT at DE was reflected in a cover article in the magazine CIO Canada which featured Kalia's picture on the cover and described the IT business relationship in terms of delivering reliable operations and executing on projects.
that drew on the time of line managers in the business above and beyond their regular responsibilities were difficult, and that explicit funding for resources would be more appropriate.
Looking to the Future Kalia and his business colleagues believed that beyond operational efficiency, the achievement of integration and standardization would represent the foundation for potential future initiatives. With data comparable and available from the currently diverse and autonomous businesses, potential new revenue sources were possible. Moreover, the prospect of integration would become a driving function for architectural evolution in IT. Kalia allowed he "had not done much with architecture" as of 2007, but saw this as a technical change which would flow out of the change in operational scope as crossbusiness integration occurred in the L2C project. Thus, a strategy was emerging to create first a business architecture, then to derive a technology architecture to deliver to the business blueprint, but with the inherent flexibility that a modern services-based architecture could provide. Manifesting this conceptual view of the business, several executives foresaw the business moving toward innovations and new business models. Kalia saw himself personally as investing time in 2007 looking to the next wave of innovation for the business, seeking out ideas from academics and vendors such as technology in the home to optimize energy use. He saw this as his role to personally "stay a step ahead" of where his IS people would be going, and also as part of the development of his team to take on more responsibility as a team and as individuals without his close involvement. King and his executives were watching a huge forthcoming project announced in Ontario in which the government would be installing over four million energy consumption meters in homes and businesses. There had been no indication of plans for the management of the data that would be required to use the meters for benefit. These and other prospective activities were being monitored, but King summarized the agenda as one of focus: The ratio of IS opex, defined as operating costs plus depreciation, to DE gross margin and DE opex has declined since 2005
The ratio of IS spend, defined as operating costs plus depreciation plus capex, to DE revenue has also declined over time Both metrics demonstrate increased IS efficiency and productivity 
